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Do	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
regula on?	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ﾧ  According	 ﾠto	 ﾠtextbook	 ﾠtheory,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠsets	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cap	 ﾠ=>	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠwill	 ﾠspontaneously	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ﾧ  The	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠis	 ﾠfunc oning:	 ﾠ
–  For	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠ12000	 ﾠindustrial	 ﾠplants,	 ﾠemi ng	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ
–  This	 ﾠcost	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterna onal	 ﾠreference	 ﾠ
–  It	 ﾠreﬂects	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfundamentals	 ﾠ(See	 ﾠGraph	 ﾠ1	 ﾠin	 ﾠannex).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ﾧ  A	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠis	 ﾠalready	 ﾠunder	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ
–  The	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠderiva ves	 ﾠtransac ons	 ﾠ(80-ﾭ‐90%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket)	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠalready	 ﾠunder	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠﬁnancial	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠ
–  There	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsigniﬁcant	 ﾠextension	 ﾠof	 ﾠharmonized	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠas	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Phase	 ﾠ3	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠscale	 ﾠauc ons	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  VAT	 ﾠfrauds	 ﾠor	 ﾠCyber	 ﾠcriminality	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspeciﬁc	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠ
markets	 ﾠ4 
Do	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
regula on?	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ﾧ  The	 ﾠEU	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠwas	 ﾠessen ally	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
regula on	 ﾠaimed	 ﾠat	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠGHG	 ﾠemissions.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ
–  A	 ﾠnew	 ﾠclass	 ﾠof	 ﾠassets	 ﾠ:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠemit	 ﾠ	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠatmosphere	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
–  A	 ﾠcompliance	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠindustries	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
asset.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  The	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠasset	 ﾠrelies	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
credibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregula on.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Disturbances	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠweak	 ﾠregula on,	 ﾠ
undermine	 ﾠconﬁdence,	 ﾠcredibility	 ﾠand	 ﾠreputa on.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Without	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠand	 ﾠcredible	 ﾠregula on,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠdisappear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ5 
The	 ﾠcomponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Using	 ﾠexis ng	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
–  Financial	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠalready	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
–  Energy	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeﬀec vely	 ﾠharmonized	 ﾠamong	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
ﾧ  No	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠconﬂict	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“tailor-ﾭ‐made”	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
“ﬁnancial	 ﾠbased”	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ
–  In	 ﾠa	 ﾠtailor-ﾭ‐made	 ﾠregula on,	 ﾠ80	 ﾠto	 ﾠ90	 ﾠ%	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠﬁnancial	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠunder	 ﾠESMA	 ﾠsupervision	 ﾠ
–  In	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“ﬁnancial	 ﾠbased”	 ﾠregula on,	 ﾠEUA	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠqualiﬁed	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“ﬁnancial	 ﾠ
instruments”,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompliance	 ﾠplayers	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexempted	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠobliga ons	 ﾠ
–  In	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcases	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeﬁne	 ﾠspeciﬁc	 ﾠrules	 ﾠtailored	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
compliance	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  A	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠchallenge:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEU-ﾭ‐ETS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
decentralized	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠEnhanced	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
coordina on	 ﾠand	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcentraliza on.	 ﾠ6 
The	 ﾠcomponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Enhanced	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠimplementa on)	 ﾠ
–  Security	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠinfrastructures	 ﾠis	 ﾠessen al	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconﬁdence.	 ﾠ
–  Conﬁdence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠplayers	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠprerequisite.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Greater	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠprocess)	 ﾠ
–  Preven ng	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠabuses	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanipula ons	 ﾠ
–  Market	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrelease	 ﾠof	 ﾠinforma on	 ﾠunderstandable	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondi on	 ﾠof	 ﾠpoli cal	 ﾠacceptance.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Facilitated	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠprice	 ﾠdiscovery	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiscussed)	 ﾠ
–  Reducing	 ﾠvola lity	 ﾠand	 ﾠavoiding	 ﾠprice	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠ
–  Primary	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠregula ons	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠ
–  Towards	 ﾠa	 ﾠquan ta ve	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠ(similar	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank)	 ﾠ?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ7 
Security	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransac ons	 ﾠ
ﾧ  At	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaunching	 ﾠof	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠmain	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠwere	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
deriva ve	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ(risks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“specula on”,	 ﾠmanipula on	 ﾠ…).	 ﾠ
ﾧ  So	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠdiﬃcul es	 ﾠhave	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspot	 ﾠ
market.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  What	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠstake	 ﾠ?	 ﾠ
–  Carbon	 ﾠassets	 ﾠworth	 ﾠ30-ﾭ‐50	 ﾠBn	 ﾠ€	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
–  Carbon	 ﾠtransac ons	 ﾠvaluing	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ70	 ﾠBn	 ﾠ€	 ﾠper	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
–  High	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠfailures	 ﾠ:	 ﾠVAT	 ﾠfrauds	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ5	 ﾠBn	 ﾠ€	 ﾠ;	 ﾠEUA-ﾭ‐
the s	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ50	 ﾠMn	 ﾠ€	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠregula on.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  The	 ﾠreal	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ﬁnd	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ27	 ﾠState	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ
–  stronger	 ﾠcoordina on	 ﾠand	 ﾠcentraliza on	 ﾠin	 ﾠregistries	 ﾠ
management;	 ﾠ
–  Harmonized	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠAllowances	 ﾠand	 ﾠliabili es	 ﾠamong	 ﾠEU.	 ﾠ8 
Market	 ﾠTransparency:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
informa on	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠ
ﾧ  A	 ﾠlot	 ﾠof	 ﾠpar al	 ﾠdata	 ﾠis	 ﾠavailable,	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠprice:	 ﾠ
–  Pre-ﾭ‐trade	 ﾠand	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐trade	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠpla orms	 ﾠ
–  Private	 ﾠdata	 ﾠproviders	 ﾠ:	 ﾠPoint	 ﾠCarbon,	 ﾠReuters,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ
–  Brokers,	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠanalysts,	 ﾠconsultants,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  A	 ﾠhuge	 ﾠquan ty	 ﾠof	 ﾠinforma on	 ﾠis	 ﾠsleeping	 ﾠin	 ﾠregistries	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
–  Each	 ﾠspot	 ﾠtransac on	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠregistered	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠ
–  It	 ﾠis	 ﾠtechnically	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠrapidely	 ﾠexhaus ve,	 ﾠreliable	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
traceable	 ﾠinforma on	 ﾠvia	 ﾠregistries	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠspot	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
–  This	 ﾠinforma on	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreleased	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ5	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠmarginally	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠoversight	 ﾠby	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠauthori es.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  	 ﾠCrucial	 ﾠneed	 ﾠof	 ﾠinforma on	 ﾠconsolida on:	 ﾠ
–  There	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠinforma on	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamentals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ(links	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠCER	 ﾠand	 ﾠERU	 ﾠentering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ)	 ﾠ
–  Market	 ﾠoversight	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠconsolida on	 ﾠof	 ﾠinforma on	 ﾠand	 ﾠclear	 ﾠ
interpreta on	 ﾠby	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠauthori es	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠregula on.	 ﾠ9 
Facilitated	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠprice	 ﾠdiscovery:	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠini al	 ﾠobserva on	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Before	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementa on	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠ
concern	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠexcessive	 ﾠprices:	 ﾠ
–  Theore cal	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠon	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐containment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠimperfect	 ﾠ
informa on	 ﾠ(Weitzman)	 ﾠ
–  “Safety	 ﾠvalves”	 ﾠdebates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
–  Over-ﾭ‐alloca on	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠﬁrst	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU-ﾭ‐ETS	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnergy-ﾭ‐Climate	 ﾠPackage	 ﾠnego a on.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ﾧ  When	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠEx	 ﾠPost,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ
collapse,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcould	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ:	 ﾠEU-ﾭ‐ETS;	 ﾠregional	 ﾠ&voluntary	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠ
ﾧ  A	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ:	 ﾠusually	 ﾠan	 ﾠover-ﾭ‐evalua on	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠby	 ﾠEx	 ﾠAnte	 ﾠassesments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ10  10	 ﾠ
Facilitated	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠprice	 ﾠdiscovery	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠinstability	 ﾠ
Supply	 ﾠ Demand	 ﾠ
Price	 ﾠ
Quan ty	 ﾠ
Demand	 ﾠchange	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
Market:	 ﾠ
Supply	 ﾠ Demand	 ﾠ
Price	 ﾠ
Quan ty	 ﾠ
Demand	 ﾠchange	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcap	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
market:	 ﾠ11 
Facilitated	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ
discovery	 ﾠ:	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠ
ﾧ  To	 ﾠreach	 ﾠits	 ﾠgoals,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠregulator	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto:	 ﾠ
–  Create	 ﾠscarcity	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠrights	 ﾠto	 ﾠemit	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠ(short	 ﾠterm	 ﾠemission	 ﾠcap)	 ﾠ
–  Create	 ﾠscarcity	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠrights	 ﾠto	 ﾠemit	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠ(long	 ﾠterm	 ﾠemission	 ﾠgoals)	 ﾠ
–  Organize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplayers	 ﾠface	 ﾠa	 ﾠprice	 ﾠsignal	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠshort	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
long	 ﾠterm	 ﾠemission/abatement	 ﾠtargets.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Standard	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠinstability	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ
–  Full	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ(avoiding	 ﾠa	 ﾠprice	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠin	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠof	 ﾠallowances)	 ﾠ
–  Some	 ﾠborrowing	 ﾠ(covering	 ﾠactual	 ﾠemission	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠrights	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“safety	 ﾠ
valve”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠcompliance	 ﾠperiods)	 ﾠ
–  Use	 ﾠof	 ﾠoﬀsets	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupplement	 ﾠallowances	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠcurve	 ﾠmore	 ﾠelas c	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshort	 ﾠrun.	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Achieving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠeﬀect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ
–  Availability	 ﾠof	 ﾠperfect	 ﾠinforma on	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ(present	 ﾠand	 ﾠfuture)	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ
–  Long	 ﾠterm	 ﾠan cipa on	 ﾠby	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠplayers	 ﾠ(implicit	 ﾠcondi on	 ﾠof	 ﾠperfect	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠ
market,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠany	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠconstraint).	 ﾠ12 
Facilitated	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠprice	 ﾠdiscovery:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠa	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank	 ﾠ(ECB)	 ﾠ
ﾧ  So	 ﾠfar	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠ(banking,	 ﾠborrowing,	 ﾠoﬀsets)	 ﾠare	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠassessments	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠimplica ons;	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ==>	 ﾠa	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠECB	 ﾠcould	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinsight.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
ﾧ  The	 ﾠintroduc on	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
harmonized	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠenlarges	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
regula on;	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ==>	 ﾠThis	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠECB	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠadjus ng	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
supply	 ﾠof	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠto	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠcondi ons.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
ﾧ  There	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠby	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates	 ﾠto	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
na onal	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠon	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠprices	 ﾠundermining	 ﾠcollec ve	 ﾠeﬃciency.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ==>	 ﾠBe er	 ﾠto	 ﾠdelegate	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠinterven on	 ﾠpreroga ves	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠECB.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
ﾧ  	 ﾠEU-ﾭ‐ETS	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠto	 ﾠﬁnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
right	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠprice	 ﾠto	 ﾠreach	 ﾠits	 ﾠshort	 ﾠand	 ﾠlong	 ﾠterm	 ﾠgoals;	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ==>	 ﾠa	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠECB	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlong	 ﾠterm	 ﾠdiscovery	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠ13 
The	 ﾠjob	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank	 ﾠ
Monetary	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠ Carbon	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠ
Final	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠ Long	 ﾠterm	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠstability	 ﾠ Long	 ﾠterm	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠreduc on	 ﾠ
trajectory	 ﾠ
Market	 ﾠoversight	 ﾠ Integrity	 ﾠand	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
transac ons	 ﾠ
Integrity	 ﾠand	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
transac ons	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Price	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠ Interest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠ Carbon	 ﾠprices	 ﾠ
Quan ta ve	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠ
•  Primary	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ Supply	 ﾠof	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠ(M0)	 ﾠ Allowances	 ﾠauc oning	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
•  Secondary	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(sell	 ﾠand	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠassets)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
Exchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐	 ﾠSell,	 ﾠbuy,	 ﾠset	 ﾠaside	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠassets	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐	 ﾠLinks	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ(oﬀsets,	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠcap	 ﾠ&	 ﾠtrades,	 ﾠ…)	 ﾠ
Repor ng	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
authori es	 ﾠ
Impacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
inﬂa on	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠ
performances	 ﾠ
Impacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
transi on	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠlow	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠ14 
Concluding	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠ
ﾧ  The	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmain	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠregula on	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ
–  	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransac ons	 ﾠ:	 ﾠan	 ﾠinforma on	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
tackled	 ﾠby	 ﾠnew	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠregistries	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠini a ve	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
secure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
–  Transparency	 ﾠand	 ﾠfairness	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransac ons	 ﾠ:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠoversight	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠdiscussed,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠraises	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
complex	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠ
–  Carbon	 ﾠprice	 ﾠdiscovery	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
•  in	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠperfect	 ﾠinforma on	 ﾠand	 ﾠperfect	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdeliver	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“right	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠprice”	 ﾠ
•  In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld	 ﾠmany	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠimperfec ons	 ﾠjus fy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠECB	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠjob	 ﾠid	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollec vity	 ﾠto	 ﾠ




For	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinforma on,	 ﾠplease	 ﾠvisit	 ﾠour	 ﾠwebsite	 ﾠ:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠwww.ChaireEconomieduClimat.org	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ANNEXES	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Annex	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ:	 ﾠCarbon	 ﾠprice	 ﾠon	 ﾠEU-ﾭ‐ETS	 ﾠ
ﾧ  Annex	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ:	 ﾠTransac on	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ






















































































































































Phase 1 (spot)  Phase 2 (DEC12) 












Source	 ﾠ:	 ﾠClimate	 ﾠEconomics	 ﾠChair	 ﾠ
New	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ	 ﾠ







Trades	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU-ﾭ‐ETS	 ﾠ









Average EUA  
spot price, €/t 
Average EUA 
price, period 2 
(Dec. 2012 
contract, €/t) 
2005  262  5,659  22.5  21.6 
2006  809  18,283  17.3  22.6 
2007  1,455  31,574  0.7  21.7 
2008  2,713  69,724  22,33  25.7 
2009  4,952  75,766  13,15  15.3 
2010  4,834  74,444  14,34  15.4 
Source	 ﾠ:	 ﾠAuthor`s	 ﾠcalcula ons	 ﾠusing	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠPoint	 ﾠCarbon,	 ﾠBlueNext	 ﾠ	 ﾠand	 ﾠECX.	 ﾠ19 
















2005	 ﾠ 39	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 43	 ﾠ 83	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ
2006	 ﾠ 57	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 44	 ﾠ 102	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
2007	 ﾠ 160	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ 88	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
2008	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 37	 ﾠ 33	 ﾠ 51	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ 49	 ﾠ
2009	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 44	 ﾠ 43	 ﾠ 73	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ 44	 ﾠ
2010	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 26	 ﾠ 26	 ﾠ 50	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
Range	 ﾠ 39-ﾭ‐160	 ﾠ 26-ﾭ‐44	 ﾠ 26-ﾭ‐44	 ﾠ 50-ﾭ‐102	 ﾠ 13-ﾭ‐34	 ﾠ 25-ﾭ‐49	 ﾠ
Vola lity	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠcommodi es	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠ%,	 ﾠ15-ﾭ‐day	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠ
average)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Source	 ﾠ:	 ﾠClimate	 ﾠEconomics	 ﾠChair	 ﾠcalcula ons	 ﾠ